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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of a substantial burden is important to a number of areas of the
law. The presence or absence of a substantial burden of one sort or another
is central to, in particular, many cases involving the Commerce Clause,' the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms,2 regulation of access to the
constitutional right to abortion,3 and to statutory protections of the free
exercise of religion.4
This Article discusses the difficulties that courts have in determining, in
each of these contexts, what constitutes a substantial burden on whatever
right, interest, process, or institution is arguably being burdened. A basic
problem is that courts and legal scholars have thus far not tried to develop
any broader understanding of substantial burdens in the law in general,
including, ironically, the possibility that what constitutes a substantial burden
in the law may importantly depend upon the context in question.
This Article thus seeks to clarify the idea of a substantial burden in
various legal contexts. This clarification depends in part on increased
attention to the general idea of a substantial burden in the law, in its ordinary
meanings, or as a term of art. The emphasis below, however, is on what a
broad survey of substantial burdens in the law can tell us about how
substantial burden analysis should crucially differ from one legal context to
another. The aim herein is ultimately to illustrate that progress in substantial
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law.
1. See infra Section II.
2. See infra Section III.
3. See infra Section IV.
4. See infra Section V. A "substantial burden" test also arises in other kinds of cases, as in
some electoral campaign regulation and voting rights contexts. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club v.
Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 737 (2011) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739-40 (2008)). See also
Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 2016). For discussion of substantial burden
"proportionalism" and exacting scrutiny in this particular area, see R. George Wright, A Hard Look
at Exacting Scrutiny, 83 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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burden analysis in the law is possible. But we will also conclude that in some
discrete kinds of cases, substantial burden analysis implicates remarkably
difficult problems involving the limits of understanding and communication.
To begin with, focusing merely on the idea of "substance," in itself, of
course, can only carry us so far. As a philosophical concept, the idea of"substance" has a distinguished history,5 but that history does not avail us
much in enhancing our understanding of substantial burdens in the law.6
Taken as an adjective, "substantial" encompasses a number of meanings,'
including, familiarly, "of ample or considerable amount or size; sizeable." 8
Such definitions add little to our intuitive understanding of "substantial."
But they may prompt us to consciously appreciate what we have in a sense
always known: the idea of "substantial" seems to straddle the boundary
between description and evaluation. We may not be able to measure the
substantial in any rigorously quantitative fashion. But when we call anything"substantial," we are to some degree reporting what we think we see before
us. On the other hand, to find anything to be "substantial" also clearly
involves some sort of evaluative or normative judgment, beyond merely
reporting what we observe.
Doubtless the very idea of a clear distinction between the descriptive and
the evaluative, in this or any other context, can always be contested. But
there does seem to be some sort of difference in general between, say,noticing and condemning.9 And when we describe something as either
substantial or insubstantial, we are not merely reporting, but normatively
judging or evaluating as well. We see this whenever we judge an amount to
be "considerable,"' 0 and even more clearly so when we characterize an
amount as "ample,"" as sufficient, or as otherwise reaching some such partly
evaluative target.
Now, the precise roles of, and interactions between, describing and
evaluating in determining whether something is substantial will doubtless be
subject to debate. Such matters may well depend upon context, even when
5. One might think, for example, of classical Platonic forms as a kind of substance. SeeHoward Robinson, Substance, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2014/entries/substance (last updated Feb. 3, 2014).
6. See id. (generally linking "substance" to being fundamental or basic).
7. See the entry for "substantial," OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/193050 (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
8. Id. at A.I.3.
9. This and related distinctions, as between describing and prescribing, are at some level
contested. Perhaps our observations and perceptions already embody some sort of evaluative
theory.
10. See supra text accompanying note 8.
11. See id.
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we focus more narrowly on the idea of substantial burdens in the law. For
now, the main point is that the idea of "substantial" in general seems to
partake, to one degree or another, of both descriptive and evaluative elements
of one sort or another.
The idea that the "substantial" incorporates both descriptive and
evaluative elements in turn suggests that one can think of being "substantial,"
in whatever context, as what the philosophers refer to as a relatively "thick,"
as opposed to a relatively "thin," concept. 12 The distinction between thick
and thin concepts can vary, but for our purposes, the idea is roughly that
"thick" concepts tend more, in themselves, to concretely convey what is
taking place in particular contexts, than do "thin" concepts.1 3 Thick concepts
tend to tell us more of concrete interest than do thin concepts. 14
While this distinction is initially obscure, it can be clarified by a
moment's reflection on some standard examples. Concepts like bravery or
courage, steadfastness, fidelity, and generosity, as well as cowardice,
betrayal, and treachery, are taken to be "thick" concepts.15  By contrast,
important but more purely abstract and bloodless concepts such as right and
wrong, good and bad, or even just and unjust are thought of as "thin"
concepts.16 Thick concepts thus more clearly have both a descriptive as well
as an evaluative component.
The idea of "substantial," as in cases of a substantial burden, thus
qualifies as a "thick" concept. "Substantial" partakes, to one perhaps variable
degree or another, of both descriptive and evaluative components.1 7 The idea
of an "ample or considerable amount or size"18 clearly invokes some sort of
literal, if imprecise, or at least metaphorical attempt to measure some quantity
12. The crucial source of the various distinctions between "thick" and "thin" concepts is
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS & THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140-42, 150-52 (1985). For
discussion of Williams on this distinction, see, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Morality Through Thick and
Thin: A Critical Notice ofEthics and the Limits ofPhilosophy, 96 PHIL. REV. 411 (1987); Michael
Smith, On the Nature and Significance ofthe Distinction Between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts,
in THICK CONCEPTS, 97-121 (Simon Kirchin ed., 2013). More broadly, see THICK CONCEPTS
(Simon Kirchin ed., 2013).
13. See Scheffler, supra note 12, at 414.
14. See id.
15. See supra sources cited in note 12.
16. See supra sources cited in note 12. The distinction between thick and thin concepts may
well be a matter of degree. See Smith, supra note 12, at 6.
17. Whether it is possible to somehow fully separate these descriptive and evaluative elements
remains contested. See the contributions in THE IS/OUGHT QUESTION (W.D. Hudson ed., 3d ed.
1969).
18. See supra text accompanying note 8. The boundary between insubstantial and substantial
will typically be inescapably vague. For background, see Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edulentries/sorites-paradox (last updated December 6,
2011).
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or magnitude. In most contexts, for example, someone who has inherited a
single dollar under a will has not thereby inherited a substantial amount of
money. This would not be a substantial bequest. But we must first find out
how much has been inherited, quantitatively, in order to begin to make that
judgment.
But this descriptive or investigative element is not all there is to the idea
of a substantial bequest. Even if we know all the conceivably relevant
numbers-e.g., the beneficiary's pre-existing budget and wealth, the size of
the total estate, its division, the beneficiary's needs and age, the purchasing
power of the dollar, average estate size, applicable estate fees, and taxes-
we must still then make an independent evaluative judgment in order to
conclude that a given bequest was or was not substantial. A bequest of, say,$500 does not tell us whether it is substantial or not. And the evaluative
component of our judgment as to whether a legal burden is substantial or not
is likely to loom even larger.
In fact, it might initially be tempting to assume that the evaluative
judgment, as opposed to the more descriptive component, will dominate any
interesting legal case involving an allegedly substantial burden. Why not
then simplify matters by treating all substantial burden cases as matters of
pure normative evaluation?
The problem with such an approach to the substantial burden cases lies
in the legal, and typically constitutional, context in which cases arise. The
substantial burden inquiry is often undertaken because we ultimately want to
know whether some practice or policy violates some provision of the
Constitution. Whether the practice or policy in question violates the
Constitution is already, crucially, a normative or evaluative question.19 So if
we treat the question of the existence, or not, of a substantial burden as a
purely evaluative test we will be answering a largely evaluative question by
means of considering another, possibly narrower, but often rather broad and
open, evaluative question. This may well be productive, and perhaps the best
we can do.
But it is also possible that our best answers to constitutional and related
legal questions may sometimes emerge from adjudicative processes that
include careful descriptive investigation into what is taking place in the
world. A burden, for example, may strike us as less substantial if we
discover, as a mostly descriptive matter of fact, that the burden can be
19. This seems uncontroversial enough, but one could ask whether it is possible for judges toagree on the descriptive facts in some constitutional case, yet disagree as to the proper constitutional
outcome of the case. Judges, might for example, agree on the relevant descriptive facts, but disagree
as to the priority, normatively, of religious free exercise and equal protection or substantive dueprocess.
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promptly, entirely, and nearly costlessly shifted, in the ordinary course of
events, to some third party.
In any event, being "substantial," as in the substantial burden cases, will
thus invariably involve a "thick" concept that may usefully bridge the
descriptive and normative realms, as do concepts such as "courageous" and
"generous." 20 We see this already at work in cases in which "substantial" is
paired not with the idea of a "burden," but with the arguably more neutral
idea of "evidence." The question of how much, or what kind, of evidence
amounts to "substantial" evidence is inevitable.
Thus in the classic administrative law case of Universal Camera v.
National Labor Relations Board,2 1 the Court confronted the unenviable task
of clarifying the substantial evidence standard.2 2 Setting aside the
complications unnecessary for our purposes, the Court verbally distinguished
substantial evidence from a "mere scintilla." 2 3 Substantial evidence must be
such that "a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a
conclusion." 24 The quantum, weight, or force of the evidence "must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established." 25
The full discussion in Universal Camera leaves us with a substantial
evidence standard that is "imprecise,"26 but that may provide "as much clarity
as the area affords." 27 The basic problem here involves the unavoidable
"thickness" of the idea of being "substantial," in the context of substantial
evidence. The substantial evidence standard is caught somewhere between
the metaphor of placing evidence in the balancing pan of a set of scales, and
the more clearly normative process of deciding whether it is fair, or otherwise
normatively permissible, to uphold a finding, given the evidence in
question.28
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
22. See id. at 477-78.
23. Id. at 477.
24. Id.
25. Id. (further indicating that the evidence must be sufficient to justify denying a directed
verdict motion in a jury case). For further discussion, see Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162
(1999).
26. Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting NLRB v. Gold Standard
Enters., Inc., 607 F.2d 1208, 1212 (7th Cir. 1979)).
27. Id. For a possible general hierarchical ranking of evidentiary standards, including that of
substantial evidence, see Parker B. Potter, Jr., Substantial Evidence, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 416, 417
(2008), http://www.greenbag.org/vl ln4/v1 1n4_o_thebag.pdf.
28. For a contrast between the "mechanics" of judging, and judging as seeking what is "fair,"
see Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record, " 64 HARV. L.
REv. 1233, 1239 (1951).
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Some attempt to disentangle the more descriptive aspects from the more
normative aspects of substantial evidence review may still be worth making.
For one thing, we can imagine an appellate court deferring to an agency's
decision where the amount or weight of evidence is thought to be crucial, and
especially where witness credibility issues are relevant.2 9 But to the degree
that substantial evidence is instead thought to be more a matter of broad
normative fairness, we would hardly expect the same degree of judicial
deference to an underlying administrative agency judgment.30
In any event, we have at this point only begun to explore the unavoidable
complications of "substance" in the law, and of substantial burdens in
particular. As we shall now illustrate, even the most straightforward cases of
substantial burdening, as in the commerce clause area, can occasionally hint
at the deeper problems lurking within substantial burdening analysis in
general.
II. SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
Substantial burdens on the flow of goods and services in interstate
commerce are often central to commerce clauses cases. This holds for cases
testing the scope and limits of the active legislative authority of Congress, 31
as well as for cases relying on the commerce clause in its dormant or
"negative" dimension to limit the exercise of state police power authority.32
As a useful example, consider the case of Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice.33  Raymond involved Wisconsin state
29. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490-91; Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 309-
10 (1974).
30. For background on the general requirements of adjudicative fairness, see Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-95 (1975).
31. For reference to substantial burdens in this context, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000) (striking down the federal Violence Against Women Act) and United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act).
See also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942) (upholding the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937).
32. See, in the dormant commerce clause context, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (plurality opinion); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646(1982) (plurality opinion); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981);
Raymond Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 424 U.S. 429,445, 447 (1978); NationalAss'n ofOptometrists
& Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012). For general discussion, see Michael A.Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework,
21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 436, 438 (1998) (discussing the Raymond "substantial burden"
standard); Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 22
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 41 (1998) (discussing the "substantial burden" test in the context of
the multi-factor balancing test endorsed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
33. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
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regulations on double trailer trucks and on trucks exceeding fifty-five feet in
length.34 The Court cited evidence that the petitioners' "operations are
disrupted, their costs are raised, 3 and their service slowed 36 by the challenged
regulations." Under these circumstances, the Court sought to implement a
rather abstract interest balancing test. The Court's balancing test in Raymond
was articulated in the following terms:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.38
Assessing the relevant regulatory costs and delays as best as they could
be ascertained, the Court in Raymond concluded that "the challenged
regulations violate the Commerce Clause because they place a substantial
burden on interstate commerce and they cannot be said to make more than
the most speculative contribution to highway safety." 39
Thus in the dormant commerce clause area in particular, the Court has
looked to the presence or absence of a substantial burden on interstate
commerce as an important constitutional threshold. The Court has
recognized that while the commerce clause is literally a congressional
regulatory power, 40 the clause also operates as "a self-executing limitation on
the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on
[interstate] commerce." 4 1
34. See id. at 436-38.
35. See id. at 436-38, 445. Query what degree of financial cost increase, in the competitive
context, alone or in combination with other factors, would amount to a burden on interstate
commerce that deserves to be adjudged "substantial."
36. See id. The slowing or delay of service, in however many instances and however severely,
might raise shipper costs as referred to in note 35 supra, but might also have other effects on the
petitioners' competitive positions. The question of when slowed or delayed service becomes a
substantial burden on interstate commerce must address both these considerations, as well,
presumably, as the number of adversely affected parties, their overall economic impact, price
elasticities, and factor substitution possibilities.
37. Raymond, 434 U.S. at 438, 445. Possible increases in the number or cost and severity of
various sorts of accidents are to be somehow factored in as well. See id.
38. Id. at 441 (quoting Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 361 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
39. Raymond, 434 U.S. at 447. Among other considerations, the Wisconsin regulations tended
to result in more total miles being driven, as loads were either broken down and separately hauled,
or diverted around the state. See id. at 438-41, 443-45. The Raymond formula is discussed and
validated in, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670-75, and in particular in id. at 674 ("Consolidated ...
demonstrated that Iowa's law substantially burdens interstate commerce").
40. See, e.g., Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion).
41. Id. See also MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 ("the Illinois Act imposes a substantial burden
on interstate commerce which outweighs its putative local benefits") (plurality opinion); Harris,
682 F.3d at 1148 ("[a] critical requirement for proving a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause
is that there must be a substantial burden on interstate commerce") (emphasis in original).
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Considerations bearing upon whether there is a burden on interstate
commerce, and whether that burden may be characterized as substantial, will
seem, in the typical such case, largely a matter of more or less readily
measured and quantifiable evidence, as of increased financial costs, mileage,
time delays, or accident rates and even the evident severity of injuries.42
But even in the dormant commerce clause area, deeper and more
evocative issues can occasionally arise. Consider in particular a remarkable
1946 case involving a criminal conviction of an African-American passenger
on a bus in interstate commerce. A Virginia statute required bus passengers
to move from one seat to another, at any time of the day or night, at the behest
of the driver, for the sake of what was deemed to be appropriate racial
relations. 4 3  The Supreme Court addressed the case not under the equal
protection clause," or even the scope of congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce,45 but under the dormant commerce clause.46
The Court in Morgan recognized a need to balance any possible
legitimate state police power interests 47 against a competing need for
uniformity in practice on the interstate or national level.4 8 Under this
historically quite understandable, if doctrinally contorted, analysis, the Court
sought to determine whether the Virginia statute placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce.
Typically, as the Court recognized,5 0 burdens on interstate commerce
take the form of more or less significant financial costs and delays.5 1 But the
Court in Morgan declared that a burden on interstate commerce might also
"arise from a state statute which requires interstate passengers to order their
movements on the vehicle in accordance with local rather than national,,52 e53 orequirements. And as well, cumulative or interactive effects, as well as
42. See supra note 39.
43. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 374, 386 (1946).
44. See, some eight years later, Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (public school
racial segregation, as addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause).
45. See, some eighteen years later, Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (racial discrimination by private parties
engaged in interstate commerce as addressed by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
46. See Morgan, 328 U.S. at 385-86.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 380.
50. See id.
51. See supra note 39.
52. Morgan, 328 U.S. at 380-81.
53. See id. at 381-82.
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matters of practical implementation, 54 can be properly taken into account. 5
In this case, the Court held, the statutory burden on interstate commerce was
undue, or excessive.56
It is difficult to honestly conclude, however, that the circumstances of
Morgan are exhausted by considerations of substantial burdens and
inefficiencies imposed on interstate commerce in the most typical mundane,
pedestrian sense. It is certainly possible that the prospect of being awakened
and imperiously re-seated, for racial reasons, may have some, perhaps a
cumulatively" substantial, net adverse effect on interstate commerce. But
this is really not entirely a matter of tangible monetary costs and time delays.
At some level, whether consciously or not, the various and subtle costs, in a
much broader and deeper sense, of indignity, humiliation, integrity, privacy,
responsive emotion and subjectivity, group dominance and subordination,
and of sheer personal inconvenience enter into a case like Morgan.
Morgan is thus not typical of the commerce clause substantial burden
inquiries. Its very uniqueness, however, begins to illustrate the potential
depth, complications, and subjectivities that may more commonly arise in
other, less fundamentally commercial contexts. A further step in that
direction is taken below in the often emotionally tinged, if not personal
identity-implicating, cases of substantial burden analysis under the Second
Amendment.
III. SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS IN THE SECOND AMENDMENT CASES
The idea of a substantial burden on a Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms is not central to the Supreme Court's recent case law. District
of Columbia v. Heller 59 recognized a prima facie individual constitutional
right to, at a very minimum, possess handguns and similar weapons in
appropriate circumstances for appropriate purposes, including home
54. See id. at 382-83.
55. See id. at 381-83.
56. Id. at 380, 386.
57. Note the aggregating of minimal individual effects into a substantial overall effect on
interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (aggregating the effects of home-
consumed wheat produced in excess of federal quotas).
58. For background, see Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail (April 16,
1963), http://www.africa.upenn.edulArticles-Gen/LetterBirmingham.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2016).
59. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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protection.o McDonald v. City of Chicago6 1 then made the right recognized
in Heller binding on the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause. 62 Heller and McDonald were thus more
about recognizing and defining the scope and boundaries of a right than about
weighing a recognized right against conflicting governmental interests.
Unavoidably, though, cases arise in which some more or less limited
restriction of recognized Second Amendment rights is imposed, for the sake
of public safety or some other cited public interest. In such cases, recognized
Second Amendment rights may be said to be burdened, whether justifiably
or not. Thus it is not surprising that even Heller6 3 and McDonald64 refer to
the idea of somehow weighing a regulatory burden on the right in question,
as do, even more explicitly, later judicial discussions by Justices Thomas and
Scalia.s
An explicit "substantial burden" inquiry, as a frequently relevant
element of a Second Amendment analysis, is now established in the court of
appeals case law. 66 What does or does not constitute a substantial burden in
the Second Amendment context is, not surprisingly, difficult to clarify with
any verbal formula.
60. See id. at 630-35 (recognizing several familiar categorical and circumstantial exceptions
to the general constitutional right). See also, e.g., Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 445-46 (5th Cir.
2016) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627-28).
61. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
62. Id. at 750, 791.
63. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 631 (referring to Justice Breyer's proportionality analysis);
id. at 634 (same); id. at 681, 689 ('where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally
protected interests in complex ways,' the Court generally asks whether the statute burdens a
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects
upon other important governmental interests") (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the free speech
electoral campaign spending regulation case of Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov'tPAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)). For discussion of Justice Breyer's proportionalist balancing more
generally, see Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, supra note 4.
64. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 858, 889, 892 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (raising at least
hypothetically the idea of potentially undue or unacceptable regulatory burdens on Second
Amendment rights).
65. See Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799, 2801 (2015)
(Thomas & Scalia, J.J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("nothing in our decision in Heller suggested
that a law must rise to the level of the absolute prohibition at issue in that case to constitute a
'substantial burden' on the core of the Second Amendment right"; arguing as well for a more
stringent level of scrutiny while apparently distrusting certain kinds ofjudicial balancing of burdens
and benefits).
66. See, e.g., Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016); Kolbe v. Hogan,
813 F.3d 160, 180 (4th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 636 Fed. App'x 880 (4th Cir. 2016); Horsley
v. Trame, 808 F.3d 1126, 1134 (7th Cir. 2015); Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 32, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165-68 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. DeCastro, 682 F.3d
160, 164 (2d Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller l1), 670 F.3d 1233, 1262 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
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At a verbal level, a substantial burden might be contrasted with a merely
minimal 67 or even an incidental 68 burden on core Second Amendment rights.
A burden, as in the form of a gun licensing fee, that is found to be
"exclusionary or prohibitive"69 might conceivably be deemed substantial.70
Heightened constitutional scrutiny, however, need not be accorded to every
"marginal, incremental, or even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and
bear arms."7
In wrestling with the constitutional meaning of a substantial burden in
the Second Amendment context, the courts have attempted to draw upon free
speech case law under the First Amendment.72 In particular, some courts
have analogized restrictions on, say, long guns, or concealed weapons, or
openly carried weapons, or on the number of gun sales outlets, as akin to
content-neutral73 time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. 74  The
implication of any analogy to content-neutral speech regulations, or more
67. See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 179-80, reh'g en banc granted, 636 F. App'x 880 (4th Cir. 2016).
68. See DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 164-65.
69. Kwong, 723 F.3d at 166.
70. See id.
71. DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 166. Some of the case law appears to combine a substantial burden
inquiry with a determination of whether a "core" Second Amendment right is being infringed, such
that even a "severe" burden may evoke only intermediate scrutiny if the severe burden is not
imposed upon a "core" aspect of the Second Amendment right. See Dearth, 791 F.3d at 43-44. For
an arguably somewhat more rigorous test, see Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961 ("if a challenged law does
not implicate a core Second Amendment right, or does not place a substantial burden on the Second
Amendment right, we may apply intermediate scrutiny"). Both Dearth and Jackson can be seen as
responses to the proportionalist test in Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257 ("a regulation that imposes a
substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment must
have a strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be
proportionately easier to justify"). See also Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965 (not all burdens on "core"
Second Amendment rights also count as substantial burdens).
72. See, e.g., Kwong, 723 F.3d at 165; DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 167; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257.
But cf Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas & Scalia, J.J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.) (denying the relevance of whether alternative means of armed self-
defense, etc., remain available under the particular Second Amendment regulation in question).
73. See, e.g., Teixeira, 822 F.3d at 1059 (citing Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964).
74. It is not easy to say whether a prohibition of one particular type of weapon, on grounds of
undue danger, should be thought of as somehow analogous to a content-neutral or a content-based
restriction on speech. For background, see the Court's attempt to treat such issues in Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (adopting an apparently expansive view of what constitutes a
content-based speech regulation) and in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (adopting
in context an apparently less expansive view). For critique, see R. George Wright, Content-Neutral
and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67
FLA. L. REv. 2081 (2015); R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of
Speech: The Limitations ofa Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (2006).
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loosely to time, place, and manner regulations, 5 would be that qualifying gun
regulations would receive something less than strict scrutiny.76
As well, courts have tried to address substantial burden questions by
considering, as in content-neutral speech regulation cases, whether the
regulation at issue leaves the affected parties with adequate alternative means
of exercising their Second Amendment rights.77 The logic here is that if a
regulation realistically leaves available ample78 or at least adequate 79
alternative means of exercising one's Second Amendment rights, no
substantial burden on such rights has been imposed, and the regulation can
properly be tested by less than rigorous judicial scrutiny.
Free speech law, at least in some content-neutral regulation contexts, has
been open to considering the adequacy of a regulated party's remaining
available means of communicating the message.80 This openness has not
always been universally shared.8 ' But the willingness of courts considering
Second Amendment substantial burden issues to borrow from free speech
jurisprudence is certainly understandable.
What is less understandable is why a Second Amendment regulation that
genuinely leaves available ample alternative means of exercising one's
constitutional rights, thus not substantially burdening such rights, should still
be tested by anything like mid-level scrutiny.82 In such cases, why not just
75. One complication is that time, place, and manner restrictions may not also be content-
neutral, as in the hypothetical case of prohibiting the expression of a disfavored viewpoint, but not
other viewpoints, by loud amplifiers, or in residential neighborhoods after dark. See the articles
cited supra note 74. As well, a free speech regulation can often be content-based more or less
regardless of the absence of any government intent to target particular ideas. See Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
76. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228; Renton, 475 U.S. at 56-57.
77. See, e.g., United States v. DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 167-68 (citing the content-neutral speech
regulation case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989)); Horsley, 808 F.3d at
1134.
78. See DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 168 ("[i]n light of the ample alternative means of acquiring
firearms for self-defense purposes, [the regulation] does not impose a substantial burden on ...
Second Amendment rights").
79. See id. at 167-68; Horsley, 808 F.3d at 1134. The interesting concealed carry regulation
case of Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) arguably turns on
issues of the adequacy of the remaining alternative means of exercising the plaintiff's Second
Amendment rights.
80. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 50.
81. See, e.g., the content-neutral anti-littering ordinance in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939) ("[i]t is suggested that the ... ordinances are valid because their operation ... leaves
persons free to distribute printed matter in other public places. But . . .one is not to have the exercise
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place").
82. See DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 167-68; Horsley, 808 F.3d at 1134; Peruta, 824 F.3d at 959.
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uphold any otherwise unobjectionable regulation?83  Complicating such
matters comes at some inevitable cost.
More broadly, we can now begin to compare substantial burden analysis
in the Second Amendment cases and in the commerce clause cases. 84 We
have seen that in the typical commerce clause cases, the question of a
substantial burden on interstate commerce can certainly be highly complex,
but ordinarily without much interesting emotional, psychological, cultural, or
spiritual depth, or any other problems of unshared experience, of incomplete
articulability, or of otherwise undistorted and full public communication.85
As mere shorthand, we may refer collectively to all such considerations as
the public communication problem.
The Second Amendment substantial burden cases, more than the typical
commerce clause substantial burden cases, do tend to raise some elements of
this overall public communication problem, to at least some modest degree.86
But as we shall eventually appreciate, the public communication issues that
do arise in the Second Amendment cases typically lack the subtlety,
centrality, the less than broadly shared experience quality, and the profundity
of the substantial burden issues addressed in certain other areas of the law. 87
It seems fair to say that whether we recognize them or not, subjective,
various emotional, cultural, and even subconscious elements may underlie a
substantial burden analysis in at least some Second Amendment cases. Such
considerations may often lack the subtlety, centrality, the unshared quality,
and the inscrutability of substantial burdening questions in some other legal
areas. They tend to involve more public communicability, in that some of
the relevant underlying psychology, including fear of physical violence,
tends to be widely, if not universally, shared.
Whatever its implications for gun regulation, gun control, or gun
availability more broadly,88 the desire for the physical safety and security of
83. One might imagine complications in making such determinations, potential abuses and
misapplications, and perhaps even, in rare cases, some sort of dignity issue, particularly with respect
to enforcement. But such a principle would offer some forms of reasonable simplification, beyond
its straightforward normative logic. For discussion in the arguably parallel free speech context, see
R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance
ofFree Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REv. 657 (1989). Perhaps emotion and strategic thinking play
a role in these contexts. See, e.g., R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Free Speech,
34 LoY. U. Ci. L.J. 429 (2003).
84. See supra Section III.
85. Even in the commerce clause area, though, we encounter rare instances in which some
such complications arise, as in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
86. See infra notes 88-90 & 119-122 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Sections IV-V.
88. For a prohibitory argument extending beyond the most typical proposed gun control
measures, see Amitai Etzioni, Gun Control? We Need Domestic Disarmament, HUFFINGTON POST
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self and family, and for some means of justifiable and proportionate defense
of self and others, is widespread and often treated as a matter of moral right,
if not moral duty.89 As well, substantial burden analysis in the Second
Amendment context should be sensitive to differential cultural, demographic,
and racial impacts of various sorts of regulation, again in light especially of
realistic self-defense concerns. 90
The Second Amendment cases thus begin to add genuine subjectivity
and emotional depth to substantial burdening analysis. For broader
perspective, and additional depth and complexity, we can now draw as well
upon the expansive case law addressing the question of undue burdening, if
not precisely substantial burdening, of the constitutional rights recognized in
the context of Roe v. Wade91 and subsequent abortion access regulation
cases. 92 It is to those cases that we now turn.
(Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/amitai-etzioni/gun-control-we-need-
domesjb 2718536.html. Of course, the constitutional focus would also shift with the adoption of
the dissenting perspectives in the Heller and McDonald cases. See District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 858
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Consider, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (C.B. Macpherson ed.) (reprint ed.
1971) (1651) ("[t]he Right of Nature ... is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he
will himself, for the preservation of ... his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in
his own Judgment, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto"). Again, we need
take no position on what such a principle should suggest regarding the availability of firearms or
their regulation. For discussion of Hobbes on this point, see A.P. MARTINICH, HOBBES 78-79
(2005); RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 70 (1989); RICHARD TUCK,
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 130 (1998 ed.) (1979); Alan
Ryan, Hobbes 's Political Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES 208, 223 (Tom
Sorrell ed., 1996).
Hobbes's state of nature-based account is in this respect later taken up and significantly modified
in SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 48-
52 (Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991) (1673); Condorcet, On the Influence of the American
Revolution on Europe, in SELECTED WRITINGS 71, 73 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976) (1786); J.G.
FICHTE, FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL RIGHT 216-25 (Michael Baur trans., 2000) (1796).
For sophisticated contemporary treatments of self-defense and related issues, see, e.g., the
contributions in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016);
Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123 (1998);
Jonathan Quong, Killing in Self-Defense, 119 ETHICS 505 (2009).
90. For a sense of the realistic group impact of various possible armed defense law regimes,
consider, e.g., CHARLES E. COBB, JR., THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF'LL GET YOU KILLED: How GUNS
MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2014); NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE
GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS (2014); Akinyele Omowale Umoja, We Will Shoot Back:
Armed Resistance in the Mississippi Freedom Movement, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 271 (2002); Erica
Evans, Does the 2nd Amendment Apply to African Americans?, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2016, 3:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-second-amendment-20160707-snap-story.html.
91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. Most authoritatively, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 877 (1992)
(plurality opinion) and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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IV. SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS IN THE ABORTION ACCESS REGULATION
CASES
Only rarely do the contemporary abortion access regulation cases refer,
literally and explicitly, to the presence or absence of a "substantial burden"
on such a right.93 The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey94
refers instead to a "substantial obstacle" 95 in the woman's path as amounting
to an "undue burden" 96 on her abortion access rights. In the context of the
magnitude of a burden, the idea of an "undue" burden seems more purely
normative than the somewhat "thicker,"97 or normatively and descriptively
mixed, idea of a substantial burden.
The Casey plurality then seeks to contrast a "substantial obstacle" to
abortion access with a mere state-created "structural mechanism" 98 by means
of which the government may promote other goals, as long as the structural
mechanism in question does not also amount to a substantial obstacle to
abortion access.99 The reference to a structural mechanism thus does not tell
us whether any particular such mechanism is also a substantial obstacle to
abortion access, and thus an undue burden on the constitutional right. 10
If the language of structural mechanisms by itself thus does not much
help in identifying substantial obstacles or, ultimately, an undue burden on
abortion access rights, can the idea of an undue burden provide useful judicial
guidance? If we know that a burden is, all things considered, genuinely
undue, it is hard to see, at least prima facie, how such a burden can be
constitutionally permissible.
The problem is that a burden that is genuinely undue, like a burden we
assume to be wrong, bad, or unjust, is already heavily if not dispositively
normative.101 The normative conclusion, and the case outcome, seem largely
built into the very term "undue." By itself, "undue burden" seem less of a
test than a way of formulating a conclusion already reached on some other
93. For an unusually close approach to this precise phrase, see Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc.
v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 2014) ("we compare the extent of the burden a law imposes
on a woman's right to abortion with the strength of the state's justification for the law. . . . The more
substantial the burden, the stronger the state's justification must be to satisfy the undue burden test.
Conversely, the stronger the state's justification, the greater the burden may be before it becomes
'undue') (emphasis added).
94. 505 U.S. 833 (1994).
95. Id. at 877-78.
96. Id. at 876-78.
97. For discussion, see supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 877-78.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20.
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grounds. No doubt courts have applied what is thought of as an undue burden
test in various abortion access cases. 02 But the important question remains
how one determines, in some judicially appropriate way, whether a burden
on a right is undue or not.
One reasonable approach to this question involves something like the
proportionalist balancing of Justice Breyer. 10 3  In the recent Hellerstedt
case,1 Justice Breyer examined Texas statutory requirements that abortion
physicians have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles,o and
that abortion facilities meet the state's requirements for ambulatory surgical
centers. 106  The Court held that both requirements placed a substantial
obstacle in the woman's path, and thus constituted an undue and therefore
impermissible burden on the petitioners' constitutional rights."o7
Underlying this general formula, however, are distinguishable possible
routes to the result. A judge could decide the substantial obstacle question,
and thus the case, by looking solely at the obstacle in question, by itself, and
determining whether or not it is, independently, substantial in magnitude. If
the obstacle in question is determined to be either substantial or insubstantial,
the case result immediately follows, assuming in the latter case that some
legitimate state interest is thought to be a stake.
But this narrow literalism would not catch the essence of a more
inclusive, proportionalist balancing, under the circumstances, of rights and
interests and the incremental effects thereon. A judge could thus seek to
somehow compare the value of promoting any at least legitimate regulatory
interest with any thereby unavoidably imposed obstacles, or any increased
obstacles, for the regulated parties. If the obstacle then seems
disproportionately large, it could be deemed to be substantial, thus effectively
determining the case. 108 Or in the alternative, a proportionalist balancing
102. The Casey plurality refers to "the undue burden standard." 505 U.S. at 876. See also, e.g.,
MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015); McCormack v. Herzog,
788 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 454
(5th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 598 (5th Cir. 2014); Planned
Parenthood v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
103. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309-10. For a discussion of Justice Breyer's constitutional
proportionalism in other contexts, see Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, supra note 4.
Justice Breyer's proportionalism in the abortion regulation context draws support from case
language such as that quoted above from Humble, supra note 93. See also Emma Freeman, Note,
Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role ofRational Basis Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 279 (2013).
104. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
105. See id. at 2310.
106. See id. at 2314-15.
107. Id. at 2318.
108. See id.
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judge could strike down a regulation even if the obstacle in question is
slightly less than substantial, if the state's legitimate interest therein is only
minimal, or only minimally promoted.109
Whatever method is adopted, and whatever the terminology employed,
courts applying Hellerstedt will consider, in some fashion, the degree of
substantiality of any burden imposed upon the constitutional rights of the
affected parties. Some sort of inquiry into the substantiality of this burden
may be avoided in name, but not in effect.
Our concern herein is with the broader nature and character of the
burdens typically involved in the abortion access cases. Such burdens have
taken many legal forms. Of late, merely for example, the courts have
addressed regulations on hospital admitting privileges,11 0 on-site medical
equipment,"' on-label prescription drug requirements," 2 and hospital site
requirements. 113
In such cases, courts often seek to determine the substantiality of the
burden in ways that may superficially resemble considerations typically at
work in the commerce clause cases.1 14 Thus courts in both contexts consider,
in some fashion, matters such as increases in travel time and distance, "5 the
relevance in the burdening context of the need to cross state borders,H6 and
the burdens of time delays and compliance requirements more generally."'
Despite these verbal similarities, though, the differences among
substantial burden analyses in the commerce clause cases, the Second
Amendment cases, and the abortion access regulation cases are more
significant than the similarities. The vast majority of the commerce clause
substantial burden cases lack the subjective, deeply emotional, basic personal
autonomy and constraint dimensions often central to many abortion access
109. See id. at 2322, 2324-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 2310; Planned Parenthood v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 796-98 (7th Cir. 2013).
111. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
112. See Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc., v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 2014).
113. See McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2015).
114. See the factors discussed throughout Section III supra.
115. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2318; Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 597-98
(5th Cir. 2014).
116. See, e.g., Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2014).
In this context as well, the state's arguments that a burden is not substantial because the right can
be exercised in some nearby jurisdiction are unavailing. See Planned Parenthood v. Schimel, 806
F.3d 908, 918-19 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.) (quoting the free speech case of Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), as cited supra note 81).
117. See, e.g., Humble, 753 F.3d at 907. Compare the various commerce clause costs and
delays noted supra Section II.
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regulation cases.118 Assessing substantial burdens in the latter cases should
involve an attempt of some sort to account for or defer to those distinctive
subjective, emotional, and personal autonomy-related considerations.
As we have seen, deep and often conflicting emotions of one sort or
another, including various sorts of fears, can characterize the Second
Amendment substantial burden cases as well.119 We need not here undertake
to catalog all of the differences between the emotions associated with the
Second Amendment and the abortion access cases. But one jurisprudentially
relevant difference does stand out.
In particular, the basic fears and concerns associated with violent
physical assault and self-defense, as described in Thomas Hobbes' classic
account of a state of nature, 120 are assumed by Hobbes to be nearly
universally shared, in more or less roughly equivalent fashion. 121 At least, no
one is exempt, based on their personal characteristics, from the logic of such
concerns.1 2 2 In contrast, the subjective experiences and the various emotions
and concerns often associated with the abortion access regulation cases1 23 are
less universally shared, and to some degree only imperfectly communicable
to a broader public.
This difference poses a distinct challenge to many judges seeking to
determine anything like a substantial burden question in the abortion access
regulation cases. Such judges should here especially resist any impulse to
universalize their own experiences, or even to rely confidently on the range
of their own empathy and imagination. 124 Deference to the experiences of
those persons most directly affected, however necessarily imperfectly
118. For background and discussion, see Lena Alex & Anne Hammarstrom, Women's
Experiences in Connection with Induced Abortion: A Feminist Perspective, 18 SCAND. J. CARING
Sci. 160 (2004); Maggie Kirkham et al., Reasons Women Give For Abortion: A Review of the
Literature, 12 ARCHIVES WOMEN'S MENTAL HEALTH 365 (2009), http://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007/s00737-009-0084-3; Mabel L.S. Lie et al., Experiences ofAbortion: A Narrative
Review of Qualitative Studies, BMC HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH (July 17, 2008),
http://bmchealthservices.biomedcentral.com/articles/1 0-1186; Catherine Pearson, 17 Women Share
How Planned Parenthood Transformed Their Lives, HUFFINGTON POST: WOMEN (Sept. 15, 2015,
4:55 PM ET), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/entry/planned-parenthood-transforms-womens-
lives__us_55fc49e7e4bOO3 10edf6da3e; Meaghan Winter, 26 Women Share Their Abortion Stories,
NYMAG (Nov. 10, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/abortion-stories-2013-11.
119. See supra notes 89-90.
120. See supra note 89.
121. See id., and in particular, HOBBES at chs. 13-14.
122. See id.
123. See the sources cited supra note 118.
124. Concisely put, an additional 150 road miles, or the necessity of a return trip, in a typical
commerce clause case and then in a typical abortion access regulation case, may have little relevant
substance in common.
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expressed, will typically be appropriate on the issue of substantial burdening
in the abortion access cases.125
As it turns out, though, yet a further layering of adjudicative
complications is added in a final category of substantial burdening cases.
These are the religious exercise cases. It is to that often remarkably subtle
and sometimes profoundly difficult category of cases that we now turn.
V. SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS IN THE RELIGIOUS EXERCISE CASES
In many cases involving restrictions on the practice of religion, it is
natural to ask, as one element of the overall statutory or constitutional
analysis, whether the exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. A
substantial burdening element is in fact explicitly written into the Federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)12 6 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) 127 in
particular.
The courts have devoted considerable attention to the question of what
constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. Religious
exercise itself has been defined broadly to include "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious beliefs."1 2 8
But this does not imply that whether an activity is required by, or is thought
to be central to, a given religion is irrelevant to whether a particular burden
is substantial or not. 129
As for the idea of a religious substantial burden, the courts have often
focused on the idea of choice on the part of the claimant, and in particular,
on something like a compelled or coerced choice,130 a pressured choice, or a
125. It could be argued that regulating the lengths of passenger trains, the width of trucks, or
the design aspects of large trucks, see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text, can involve fears
for personal safety, whether supported or not by available accident studies. Even if so, the role of
such considerations in typical commerce clause cases is typically reduced, less central, and more
manageable, partly through undisputed empirical data. The Morgan case, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), is
plainly exceptional in this regard. As well, the chances that a particular judge will be incapable of
empathizing with anyone being passed on the highway by a large truck in the rain seem limited.
126. Pub. L. No. 103-41, 107 Stat. 1488, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(1)-(4) (2016).
127. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(l)-(5). (2016).
128. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), quoted in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860, 862
(2015). We may similarly assume that the reference to a belief "system" is not intended to deny
protected status to otherwise recognizable religions and beliefs that one might not think of as
especially "systematic."
129. Of course, judicially determining whether a particular belief is central to a claimant's other
beliefs, or to some identified religious tradition, is likely to itself be controversial.
130. For an argument that the concept of "coercion" in much of the Religion Clause area is
currently muddled, see R. George Wright, Why the Coercion Test Is of No Use in Establishment
Clause Cases, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 193 (2011).
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substantially or unmistakably pressured choice between religious fidelity,
and obtaining some significant government benefit or avoiding the
imposition of some meaningful penalty. 131
In determining whether there is a substantial burden on religious
exercise, the availability of alternative religious activities may be of
questionable relevance. Resolving such issues may require some degree of
precision in describing the circumstances. We can, on the one hand,
understand how there could be a substantial burden on religion in a case in
which some religiously mandatory, non-substitutable practice is prohibited,
even if the claimant is permitted religious exercise in various other separate
respects.132 On the other hand, there is again133 an argument that if the
religion itself clearly and uncontestedly allows for a number of equally
appropriate available ways of complying with a given general requirement,
then the burden on religion is in that respect not substantial. 134
As well, in typical cases, the imposition of a generally applicable, non-
confiscatory tax on religious entities, among other parties, does not amount
to a substantial burden on religious exercise. 135 Nor does a government's
failure to itself join in a particular religious practice,136 or, without more, a
government's adoption of policies the claimant regards as religiously
objectionable."
The most interesting substantial burden cases, however, are those in
which the claimant's argument regarding the burden in question strikes many
observers as murky, incoherent, mistaken as to law or fact, unintelligible, or
131. See, at the level of the free exercise of religion before Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), the unemployment compensation case of Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,450-51 (1988); Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706 (1986). Under the more recent religious exercise statutes, see, e.g.,
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 533 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (referring to a
"forced" choice or coercion under "threat of civil or criminal sanctions"); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v.
Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring "more than an incidental effect
on religious exercise," with a substantial burden as "akin to significant pressure which directly
coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly"). An "incidental" burden
in this sense is non-substantial, as are burdens on unrelated parties, and burdens that are only "slight,
negligible, or de minimus." Priests for Life v. HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated
on other grounds; Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
132. See, e.g., Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 862; Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch, No. 14-
15143, 2016 WL 1359239, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2016).
133. See supra notes 81 & 116 and accompanying text.
134. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1227; Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th
Cir. 1995).
135. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990);
Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
136. See Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-70.
137. See id.
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otherwise relevantly deficient.'" Remarkably subtle and even profound
difficulties can arise in such cases, as it is also well established that courts
are not, in general, to assess the plausibility or the public comprehensibility
of a religious claim or doctrine.1 3 9
Thus the deepest and most interesting substantial burden cases tend to
involve religious claims that seem to rest, in some crucial respect, on what
many outsiders consider a cognizable mistake of one sort or another. This
kind of case can be illustrated through a much simplified version of the
substantial burden analyses in the cases ultimately vacated by the Court in
the Zubik v. Burwell140 contraceptive health insurance case.
In our simplified version of Zubik, we assume that a religiously
motivated party is legally required to sign or otherwise simply process a
single-page document, at only a minimum administrative cost, where
noncompliance would involve significant financial penalties. The religious
party objects to this requirement as a substantial burden on its religious
exercise. When asked to explain the nature of the burden, the religious party
responds that processing the document would, on its religious view, involve
something like causing, enabling, triggering, facilitating, participating, in,
condoning, or some religiously objectionable form of complicity or other
form of cooperation with what the religious party considers a serious moral
evil. 141
138. See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Hamilton, J., concurring), vacated on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016) (per curiam) ("[tihis
is not an issue of moral philosophy but of federal law. Federal courts are not required to treat Notre
Dame's erroneous legal interpretation as beyond their reach-even if that interpretation is also a
sincere and religious belief. Notre Dame is not entitled to nullify the law's benefits for others based
on this mistake of law, which is the foundation of its claim of a substantial burden").
139. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (citing, inter alia, Smith, 494 U.S. at 887; Hernandez, 490 U.S.
at 999; Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. HHS, 801 F.3d 927, 942 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, Univ. of Notre
Dame v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2006 (2016) (per curiam) ("[r]eligious beliefs need not be 'acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others' to deserve protection" (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 714)). See also the Flying Spaghetti Monster RLUIPA case of Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, No. 4:14-
CV-3183, 2016 WL 1446447 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal filed (8th Cir. May 5, 2016).
140. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). Among the vacated cases, the majority of which had
found no substantial burden on the claimants under RFRA, were Michigan Catholic Conference &
Catholic Family Serv. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2015); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. HHS, 801
F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015); Grace Schools v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015); Catholic Health
Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v.
Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir.
2015); Priestsfor Life v. HHS, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
141. Such language recurs throughout the relevant cases. See, e.g., Catholic Health Care Sys.,
796 F.3d at 222; Eternal Word Television Network, 756 F.3d 1339, 1340, 1343, 1345 (Pryor, J.,
specially concurring).
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To this, the government and many courts may reply that the religious
party is mistaken, at least as to the legal meaning and implications of
processing the document in question. Processing the document instead, it has
thus been argued by the government, has the legal effect of absolving the
religious party of any relevant consequences, and of shifting causal
responsibility for any supposedly evil effects to other independent voluntary
actors. 142
Given this conflict between the religious actor and the government, it
might be tempting to conclude that all such cases are actually easy, as it is
well established that the existence of a substantial burden in this context is a
question of law, for determination not by private claimants, but by the
courts. 14 3 Unfortunately, this principle marks only the beginning, and not the
key to the resolution, of the inquiry.
The court alone clearly must determine whether a substantial burden
exists in the religion cases. 144 The important question, though, is how the
court is to do so. Crucially, this involves the court's determining when to
declare the religious claimant's assertions to be somehow relevantly legally
defective, 145 and when to accommodate a religious assertion, or more
particularly its grounds, as entitled to accommodation despite its
implausibility or apparent incoherence. 146
In our simplified case, for example, a court might reasonably find that
merely processing the document in question does not amount to triggering,
enabling, facilitating, or legally causing any alleged evil. Nor would it
suffice for legal complicity, in the sense of legal accomplice liability, 147 in
any such evil. The crucial question, however, is whether a court should take
into account, for example, the possibility that sincere religious standards for
religious or moral complicity, or for moral responsibility in general, may be
more scrupulous and more demanding than the typical legal standard.
At a very minimum, it has been argued that moral complicity may be
broader than legal complicity,1 48 or than familiar understandings of
142. For such arguments in the actual cases, see, e.g., Grace Schools, 801 F.3d at 804-05; Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1182-83; Geneva College, 778 F.3d at 438-40.
143. See, in the actual cases, Grace Schools, 801 F.3d at 804; Catholic Health Care Sys., 796
F.3d at 217; Little Sisters of the Poor Home For the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1176.
144. See the sources cited supra note 143.
145. See, e.g., the authorities cited supra notes 138 & 142.
146. See the authorities cited supra note 139.
147. For discussion of some of the complications of corporate accomplice liability in civil and
criminal contexts, see R. George Wright, A Negotiation-Based Approach to Corporate Human
Rights Liability, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REv. (forthcoming 2016).
148. See, e.g., Gregory Mellema, Legal Versus Moral Complicity, 1 AM. INT'L J. CONTEMP.
RES. 126, 126 (2011). Cf Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (1849),
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causation.149 On some religious understandings, complicity can be subtle,
apparently passive, multi-dimensional, a matter of public perception, and in
some cases, unusually broad in scope. In particular, religious understandings
of culpable complicity need not require what would ordinarily be thought of
as participation, or assistance. In some circumstances, religious complicity
could conceivably involve even merely perceived or actual toleration,
acquiescence, passivity, or subtle legitimation.150  The actual or publicly
perceived degree of association with the purported evil may matter. 51  In
some cases, though, any degree of association with the evil may be thought
to be deeply objectionable. 152
Under current law, the degree of persuasiveness of any religious belief
as to good and evil is largely irrelevant, as is the degree of moral
scrupulousness that is religiously required. 153 On the other hand, in cases in
which a religious entity perceives a need to dissociate or publicly distance
itself from some objectionable activity, the courts should ask whether,
paradoxically, a claimant's sustained public course of actively litigating the
case in the federal courts does not, on the claimant's own theory, itself reduce
or eliminate the complicity at issue.
Unfortunately for the clarity of the law, the familiar document-
processing moral complicity cases do not begin to plumb the depths of the
difficulties in adjudicating religious based substantial burden cases. The
claimant in such a case must characterize and establish the weight of a burden
that may derive from experiences that are not only emotional, 154 or not widely
http://xroads.virginia.edu/-hyper2/thoreau/civil.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) ("[w]hat I have to
do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn"). In Thoreau's
usage, the idea of "lending" oneself may be unclear, variable, or debatable in its scope and meaning.
For more specific discussion, see Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas
for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby's Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015).
149. See Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, I CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289 (2007). More
broadly, see CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE (2000).
150. For broad discussion of cooperation with presumed evil on several distinct axes, see
Germain Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, Appendix 2: Formal and Material Cooperation in
Others' Wrongdoing, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, http://www.twotlj.org/G-3-A-2.html (visited
Sept. 21, 2016). See also ANDREW MCLEAN CUMMINGS, THE SERVANT AND THE LADDER:
COOPERATION WITH EVIL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
151. See supra note 150; Christian Medical & Dental Association, Moral Complicity with Evil
Ethics Statement, https://cmda.org/resources/publication/moral-complicity-with-evil-ethics-
statement (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
152. See supra notes 150 & 151.
153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. For present purposes, we of course set aside
all questions as to the merits of the statutes in question, or of special protection for religious exercise.
For discussion, see RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); BRIAN LEITER, WHY
TOLERATE RELIGION? (2014); STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2014).
154. See supra Sections III-IV.
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shared,155 but that are in some sense intensely private, personal, mystical,
visionary, ineffable, barely articulable, and thus only minimally susceptible
to verbal formulation and public communication.1 5 6 Thus many religious
claims going to the nature and weight of a burden must rely, to one degree or
another, on something like crude translation, analogy, imperfect model,
indirection, symbol, and metaphor."
When courts consider claims as to the nature and weight of religious
burdens that cannot entirely bypass all reliance on inadequate language, two
opposing perspectives should each play a role. On the one hand, courts may
to one degree or another appropriately apply what is known as a principle of
interpretative charity, or of interpretive humanity.' 5 8 While such a principle
can be interpreted in various ways,1 5 9 one such approach would, all else
equal, actively seek as much meaning, coherence, and intelligibility in the
155. See supra Section V.
156. Consider the practical problem of conveying, in the course of federal litigation, the
magnitude of a burden that is crucially grounded in one's sense of the "numinous." See RUDOLF
OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF
THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION TO THE RATIONAL (John W. Harvey trans., 1958) (1925).
157. For discussion, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, at question 13,
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1013.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2016); IAN G. BARBOUR,
MYTHS, MODELS, AND PARADIGMS 7, 127-31 (1974); WILLIAM DOWNES, LANGUAGE AND
RELIGION: A JOURNEY INTO THE HUMAN MIND 253 (2011); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (2d ed. 2003) (arguing for a recognition of our broad reliance on
metaphor); SALLIE MCFAGUE, METAPHORICAL THEOLOGY: MODELS OF GOD IN RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE 1 (1982) (noting that one can "feel conviction at the level of experience ... but great
uncertainty at the level of words"); BASIL MITCHELL, HOW TO PLAY THEOLOGICAL PING-PONG:
ESSAYS ON FAITH AND RELIGION 185 (William J. Abraham & Robert W. Prevost eds., 1990)
(distinguishing among the above cited categories); FRANK J. SHEED, THEOLOGY AND SANITY 59
(1993 ed.) (1946); JANET MARTIN SOSKICE, METAPHOR AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 141, 152
(reprint ed. 2002) (1985); ROBERT M. WHITE, TALKING ABOUT GOD: THE CONCEPT OF ANALOGY
AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 186 (2010); William P. Alston, Religious Language,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6 (William J. Wainwright ed., 2007)
(noting the possibility that in some cases, the meaning of a religious claim may crucially depend on
criteria internal to the practice of that religious language); Cynthia B. Cohen, The Logic ofReligious
Language, 9 RELIG. STUD. 143, 143 (1973); Brian Davies, The Limits ofLanguage and the Notion
ofAnalogy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AQUINAS ch. 28, at 390, 394 (Brian Davies & Eleonore
Stump eds., 2012); Victoria S. Harrison, Metaphor, Religious Language, and Religious Experience,
46 SOPHIA 127, 130 (2007); Kai Nielsen, Religious Discourse and Arguing From Ordinary
Language, 5 METAPHILOSOPHY 106 (1974); Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy and Religious Language, 54
J. RELIG. 71 (1974); J. Heywood Thomas, Religious Language as Symbolism, 1 RELIG. STUD. 89
(1965).
158. For background, see Christopher Gauker, The Principle of Charity, 69 SYNTHESE 1, 1
(1986); Richard Grandy, Reference, Meaning, and Belief, 70 J. PHIL. 439 (1973); Frank I.
Michelman, On the Uses of Interpretive Charity (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 08-26, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263503; David Vessey, The Method of Question and Answer As a
Principle of Charity in Gadamer's Hermeneutics, 51 RECHERCHES EN PHILOSOPHIE 1 (2009).
159. See supra note 158.
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religious claimant's 160 language as such language will admit. This is roughly
a matter of assuming, until the contrary is established, the lucidity and general
common groundness of one's fellow human persons, and of reasonably
seeking to validate that assumption.
On the other hand, or at the other extreme, there is also the view that at
least some religious considerations, even if crucial to a claim of substantial
burdening, simply cannot be meaningfully articulated. At such points
Ludwig Wittgenstein famously concluded that "whereof one cannot speak,
thereof one must be silent."l 6 1 Silence, or publicly meaningless discourse,
does not advance the claimant's legal assertion of substantial burdening. 162
But these rare instances need not be blamed on the use of the particular legal
test, or on the legal system in general.1 63
More typically, judges should try to distinguish between arguments that
a claimant does not understand her own religious beliefs and perhaps also
that the court or others do, which is possible, but unlikely and arguments, in
contrast, that a claimant is crucially relying on her own mistaken
interpretation of some publicly accessible and readily investigable matter of
160. There is of course no reason to limit a principle of interpretive charity to the realm of
religious discourse, as distinct from the public communicability issues raised supra Section IV.
161. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LoGIcO-PHILOSOPHICUS, prop. 7, at 90 (C.K.
Ogden trans., 1922) (Cosimo Pub. ed., 2007) (1921). For discussions of Wittgenstein on religion,
see D.Z. PHILLIPS, WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGION (1993); NORMAN MALCOM, WITTGENSTEIN: A
RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW? 77 (1994); Brian Davies, Wittgenstein on God, 55 PHIL. 105 (1980).
To the extent that religious discourse can be viewed as a distinct "language game," with partially
internal meanings, rules, and practices, see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATION § 23, at 15 (G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte trans.) (rev. 4th
ed., 2009) (1953); James Kellenberger, The Language-Game View of Religion and Religious
Certainty, 2 CAN. J. PHIL. 255 (1972); Patrick Sherry, Truth and the "Religious Language-Game,"
47 PHIL. 18 (1972).
162. Neither, presumably, would the also-rare phenomenon in which a religious substantial
burden case genuinely hinged on a matter of logic or meaning that was inevitably entirely internal
to the lived practice of the religion in question. For background, see the authorities cited supra note
161.
163. For a more general discussion of contexts in which we should be either more, or less,
willing to defer to the assertions of other persons when we are unable to find such assertions
sufficiently understandable or persuasive on the merits, see PHILIP SOPER, THE ETHICS OF
DEFERENCE 176 (2002) (focusing in particular on intensity of belief and on the nature of the
conviction in question). Of course, a judge would in many cases wish to factor in any disparities in
acknowledged expertise, considerations of arrogance and magnanimity, the possibility of public
educative or symbolic effects, risks of abuse of one judicial outcome or another, the degree of
predictability of the effects of judicial outcomes, and, typically most importantly, the effects of
deference to the religious exemption claimants, on the judicial outcome in general, on the important
rights and interests of third parties. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing
Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby's Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015).
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genuinely relevant secular law or fact.16 Making due allowances for the
claimant's foibles and limitations, and for their own fallibility, courts should,
where necessary, be generally willing to undertake the latter sort of
investigation.
Unavoidably, any sensitive approach to substantial burdening issues in
the religious exercises cases will result in some false positives, in the sense
of finding a substantial burden on the exercise of religion where no such
burden genuinely exists. There will also be, more importantly, cases in which
the burden on religion can be considered substantial, but not especially
weighty in comparison with the rights and interests of unconsenting third
parties that would have to be sacrificed in order to reduce or eliminate the
burden on religion.
It should be remembered that in the latter cases, a finding of a substantial
burden on religion does not decide the case, even where strict scrutiny of any
such burden is legally required. 165 Some countervailing rights and interests
may prevail. What counts as a sufficiently crucial right or as a compelling
governmental interest, and as narrow tailoring, can certainly be contested. 166
It might even be possible, in some cases, to cite demonstrable financial cost
concerns, and related effects of those costs, as a sufficiently compelling such
interest. 167
More important than direct compliance costs imposed on governments
by religious accommodation, typically, will be any thereby required
sacrifices, and perhaps disproportionate sacrifices, on the part of
unconsenting third parties. Those effects on the rights and interests of
unconsenting third parties may range from minimal168 to dramatic. 169 And
there is in any event ample room for debate over the propriety of the strict
164. This could include cases in which the claimant's case crucially depends on the reasonably
demonstrable truth or falsity of her characterization of the religious beliefs of some other person or
organization, to which she may not have or claim privileged access. For interesting background,
see Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 930 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (regarding
a North Carolina prison system construal of Jewish doctrine).
165. See the statutory citations supra notes 126 & 127. The RLUIPA statute, for example,
requires that the substantial burdening advance "a compelling governmental interest" through "the
least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
166. For background, see R. George Wright, What If the Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were
Abandoned?, 45 U. MEMPHIS L. REv. 165 (2014); R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the
Broader Problem ofStrict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REv. 759 (2012).
167. For discussion of such a possibility, see the prisoner kosher meal RLUIPA case of United
States v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep 't. Corrections, No. 4:16cv27-WS/GRJ, 2016 WL 4708479 (11th Cir. Sept.
8, 2016).
168. See, e.g., the prison beard length RLUIPA case ofHolt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
169. For background, see Sepinwall, supra note 163.
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scrutiny standard, among other possible standards, 170 in some or all of the
religious substantial burdening cases.171 On any such question, though, we
need here take no position.1 72
VI. CONCLUSION: RELATING THE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ANALYSES IN
THE VARIOUS CONTEXTS
As it turns out, the various substantial burden subject matter areas
discussed above are therein ranked in ascending order of their typical depth
and complexity. Thus, what we have called problems of public
communicability generally become more difficult as we move, in order, from
the commerce clause cases17 1 to the Second Amendment cases,174 to the
abortion access regulation cases, 7'5 and then to the religious exercise cases. 16
Thus as we have seen, the commerce clause cases can certainly involve
difficult issues of empirical evidence and of long-term or indirect policy
consequences. Commerce clause substantial burden cases involving
meaningful elements of deep emotion and other subjectivities will, however,
170. For less stringent, perhaps proportionalist, alternatives, see the discussion in Wright, A
Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, supra note 4.
171. For commentary on substantial burdening issues confined to the specific context of the
RFRA statutory religious exercise cases, see, e.g., University of Illinois Law Review, Symposium
on Substantial Burdens Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, https://illinoislawreview.org/
online/2016/substantial-burdens (last visited Sept. 23, 2016); and Coverage of Zubik v. Burwell,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/zubik-v-burwell (last visited Sept. 23,
2016) (focusing largely on the developing Zubikv. Burwell litigation), as well as the debate between
Professors Steven D. Smith and Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate and Religious
Freedom, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 261 (2013). See also Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of
Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47
(2010) (noting the frequent use of de facto interest balancing in such cases); Douglas Laycock &
Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1021 (2012); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, The Immanent
Frame, IMMANENT FRAME, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/07/08/impossibility-of-religious-freedom
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016); Eugene Volokh, Prof Michael McConnell on Zubik v. Burwell, WASH.
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 17, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/05/17/prof-michael-mcconnell.
172. If some courts decide religious substantial burden issues, specifically, based partly on the
effects of such a determination on the rights and interests of others, see Greenawalt, supra note 171,
the judicial process is then not a matter of weighing a separately determined substantial burden and
then separately applying some level of judicial scrutiny, or a distinct balancing test. The judicial
determination in such a case would instead seem to be irreducibly holistic, as opposed to sequential
or step-wise, and perhaps largely intuitive. For general background, see R. George Wright, The
Role ofIntuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUSTON L. REV. 1381 (2006).
173. See supra Section II.
174. See supra Section III.
175. See supra Section IV.
176. See supra Section V.
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be rare. The Second Amendment substantial burden cases, to the extent that
they implicate physical risks of one sort or another to self and others, tend to
involve a greater role for emotion and subjectivity. But these cases tend, in
this respect, in turn to be less judicially problematic than the abortion access
regulation cases. This is largely because the emotions and subjective
elements of the Second Amendment cases, however profound, tend to be
more nearly universally shared, at least at some basic level, and thus more
fully publicly communicable even in the course of formal litigation.
By contrast, the abortion access substantial burden cases tend to involve
subjective elements, including complex and deep emotion, that resist full
articulation and public communication, particularly to courts whose members
cannot, despite their best intentions, fully share the experiences and
subjectivities at stake in the substantial burden determination. Such cases
thus raise more difficult cases of judicial deference and certitude.
The religious substantial burden cases, under current law, then add what
might be called a further cultural or even metaphysical aspect. Some
religious substantial burden cases, certainly, will involve enough public
communicability for a confidently arrived at judicial conclusion. Other such
cases, however, may unavoidably involve attempts by the claimant to
construct a publicly accessible logic of the ineffable and the numinous, or to
show a partial reliance on such phenomena, in the course of litigation. At the
very least, ideas may be relied upon by the religious claimant that may seem
incomprehensible, or simply confused, to the judicial mind. In such cases,
courts may sometimes reach a satisfactory result without resolving the
substantial burden issue, perhaps by conceding a substantial burdening, but
then focusing on the rights and interests of third parties. But if not, courts
must then be prepared to consider the proper scope and limits of a reasonable
interpretive charity and of judicial deference in the most profoundly difficult
contexts.
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